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SOME PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC REASON IN
JOHN RAWLS'S POLITICAL LIBERALISM
Kent Greenawalt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

PoliticalLiberalism' is a major addition to the political theory of
John Rawls. In many respects, it develops or alters views expressed in
his famous A Theory of Justice.2 For changes that appeared in various
articles Rawls published after the earlier book, Political Liberalism
tends to offer nuances of difference. The most original chapter is
about public reason,3 and my comments are directed to that subject,
which has now become a centerpiece of Rawls's theory. I draw in
Rawls's other views only as they bear on public reason.
My aim is to present some problems I see with his account. When
I am unclear about how he means to deal with a difficulty, I suggest
various possibilities. Once I have settled on an interpretation of
Rawls, I compare that with the position I find most persuasive. This is
not the occasion to provide any full account of my own views, but
some readers may be encouraged to read further.'
At the outset I want to identify a complicating factor and to explain my treatment of it. Since the publication of PoliticalLiberalism,
Professor Rawls has presented in various settings a paper entitled The
Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations.5 This article in progress clarifies and develops some positions he took in PoliticalLiberalism. Since relatively few readers will have seen his unpublished
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law; A.B., Swarthmore College, 1958; B. Phil., Oxford University, 1960; LL.B., Columbia, 1963. An earlier version of
this Essay was presented at the Jurisprudence Section Program, Association of American
Law Schools Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 8, 1995.
1. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
2. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
3. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 212-54.

4. My own perspectives are most fully developed in KErr GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
(1995). That book includes a chapter on Rawls which
appeared in somewhat revised form in Kent Greenawalt, On Public Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 669 (1994). Many of my views are also indicated in KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
5. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations (Nov. 2, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter
Rawls, draft article].
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
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article, and since Rawls's work on the article is not yet complete, I did
not think I should comment extensively on what he says there. At the
same time, it hardly seems productive to raise questions Rawls has
already answered in a convincing way in the draft article. Thus, I focus on problems that I believe are not yet satisfactorily resolved.
When I interpret Political Liberalism, I do so in accord with my understanding of Rawls's draft article. Occasionally, I refer to the draft
when I think it helps clarify Rawls's position.
My comments are mainly critical, but they need to be understood
incontext. PoliticalLiberalismis a work of abstract political philosophy; it presents a contractarian account of liberal democracy that does
not rely on,a controversial theory of the good. The idea of public
reason that forms a crucial part of that account involves some compromise between an ideal of having people resolve political issues on the
basis of shared reasons and having them refer to the whole truth as
they conceive it. Public reason is conceived primarily as a matter of
self-restraint about political decisions6 and the bite of its demands varies depending on one's role in political life. Though I put greater emphasis on a society's particular history and culture than does Rawls, I
do not doubt the value of either abstract political philosophy or of
contractarian analysis that does not depend on any particular theory
of the good. I have no "global" doubts about Rawls's work; indeed I
share the widespread opinion that it is'immensely important. I believe
in public reason as self-constraint. I am also in agreement with Rawls
that a properly conceived ideal of public reason operates differently
according to people's roles and does not exclude all reliance on
broader philosophies of life that compete within a society. Thus, my
doubts and disagreements emanate from a broad sympathy with what
Rawls undertakes. Further, on the wide spectrum of views about public reasons, both our views represent intermediate positions that are
not too far apart.
I shall comment on three problems. The first is the distinction
Rawls draws between constitutional issues and matters of basic justice
on the one hand, and "ordinary" political issues on the other.7 The
second is the precise relation between one's appropriate reliance on
6. If enough officials or people rely on other than public reasons for the adoption of
legislation, courts might declare the legislation unconstitutional-as a violation of the Establishment Clause, for example. A practice of relying on public reasons could have this
sort of legal backup. These possible implications are, of course, of great importance for
lawyers, but Rawls does not discuss them directly, and I do not consider them here. I treat
some of them briefly in Religious Convictions and Political Choice, supra note 4, at 244-60.
7. See infra part II.
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comprehensive perspectives and public reasons.' The third is the fundamental assumption that fairness in liberal democracies in general
requires reliance on public reasons in respect to constitutional issues
and matters of basic justice. 9

Rawls says, rightly I believe, that within any genuine liberal democracy, citizens are bound to have varying perspectives on fundamental subjects of philosophy and religion.'" There will be a plurality
of what he calls comprehensive views." If citizens are to enjoy equal
respect, they should not be coerced in respect to fundamental political
matters on the basis of reasons they cannot reasonably be expected to
accept. Coercing people on the basis of the comprehensive views that
others hold may well entail coercing them on the basis of reasons they
could not reasonably be expected to accept. A Jew cannot be expected to accept reasons that derive from Christian premises; an atheist cannot be expected to accept reasons that derive from theistic
premises. The way out of this dilemma is for people to rely on public
reasons, reasons that citizens share as members of the same political
community.' 2 One can base the argument for public reasons on fairness or on harmony and stability, or both; Rawls's main emphasis is
now on fairness.' 3

The difficulty with asking people to rely on public reasons is that,
if they do so, they may have to forego what they believe are really the
best reasons for resolving particular problems. Thus, to take an issue
to which I will return, a Roman Catholic who addresses abortion legislation would have to refrain from relying on a confidently held religious belief that from the moment of conception an embryo is entitled
to the moral status of a full human being. Does asking people to refrain from relying on what they believe most deeply itself create a
kind of unfairness? Rawls's response is that in a liberal democracy
most comprehensive views will be reasonable, endorsing the premises
of liberal democracy including an ideal of public reason. 4 Someone's
own comprehensive view will, in effect, indicate that for the resolution
8. See infra part III.
9. See infra part IV.
10. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 216-17.
11. Id. at 135, 218-19.
12. In one formulation, Rawls says that "on matters of constitutional essentials and
basic justice," justification should "appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and
forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science
when these are not controversial." Id. at 224.

13. See id. at 225-26.
14. Id. at 218-19.
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of certain political issues, a person holding that view should not rely
on some sources of understanding that would be appropriate for decisions about how to lead her personal life and relate to others outside
politics.
Rawls suggests that while judges are constrained to follow public
reasons in all their decisions of legal questions, the limits of public
reason apply to citizens and legislators only in regard to "constitutional essentials" and questions of basic justice.' 5 The constitutional
essentials include "fundamental principles that specify the general
structure of government and the political process" and "equal basic
rights and liberties of citizenship."'1 6 Questions of basic justice include
basic issues regarding social and economic opportunities and distribution of income. Some minimal principle of opportunity and the provision of basic needs for all citizens are themselves constitutional
essentials; other claims about opportunities and welfare fall within
questions of basic justice although they are not constitutional
essentials.17
II. AN UNEASY DIVISION
Let us postpone for the moment discussing exactly what the constraint of public reasons entails when it does apply. The constraint
does not apply when legislators and citizens address "ordinary" issues
like the environment, the treatment of animals, and military policy.
Thus, legislators and citizens may rely on some sources and make
some arguments in respect to ordinary political issues that would be
inappropriate if constitutional essentials or questions of basic justice
were at stake. For example, they might appropriately argue that the
Bible indicates that we should be more respectful of animals, but they
could not properly rest an argument for a restrictive abortion law primarily on what the Bible says.
My first point about this division is a simple one. For people to
recognize this categorization among issues and to act differently in respect to the two categories requires considerable political sophistication and discipline. People may think it odd that considerations
appropriate for one kind of political issue are, in a sense, foreclosed
for another. This difficulty casts doubt on the feasibility of a restraint
of public reasons formulated in this way. Because a sound normative
15. Id. at 214.

16. Id. at 227. These could be constitutional essentials even if there were no written
constitution guaranteeing them.
17. IM.at 228-29.
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principle of political philosophy must be one that human beings can
observe reasonably well, doubts about feasibility amount to doubts
about the wisdom of a proposed principle.
My second point on this subject is more complex; it concerns the
interrelationship between ordinary issues on the one hand, and constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice on the other. Rawls
understandably treats a right to abortion as a constitutional essential
because it involves a fundamental right of women.18 I begin from this
assumption in order to illustrate my point, but the general point would
survive even if one disagreed with Rawls about where abortion stands.
In past years, the use of fetal tissue for medical research and treatment has been highly controversial; a recent variation on this issue
involves the artificial creation of human embryos for research and
medical purposes. These issues appear to be in the realm of ordinary
politics-especially if the resolution of the constitutional essential establishes that a pregnant woman should have a right to an early
abortion.
When considering legal restraint of abortion, the constitutional
essential, legislators and citizens cannot rely on the authority of the
Bible or the Roman Catholic Church as primary support for a restrictive law-or for a constitutional amendment permitting restrictive
laws. They may not mainly assert, "We should treat the newly conceived embryo as a human being because the Bible or the Church says
that we should." That reliance would violate the constraint of public
reason for constitutional essentials because the reliance would be
upon a comprehensive view.
What now of issues of medical use of fetal tissue and the creation
of human embryos? The status of embryos again seems highly relevant, but because the issue is only an ordinary one, reliance on the
Bible or the Church may be all right. We see that exactly the same
question-the moral status of embryos and early fetuses-can arise in
regard to constitutional essentials and ordinary issues. It seems artificial to suppose that techniques of reasoning from comprehensive
views may be used to answer the same question in one context but not
the other.
In respect to use of fetal tissue obtained from abortions, the connection of questions may be even closer. One argument against such
use is that it will encourage women to have abortions. Would it be
appropriate to argue that medical use of fetal tissue should be forbid18. Id at 243 n.32.
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den or discouraged because it will encourage abortions, which themselves are wrong according to the Bible or the Church? Since the
permissibility of abortion itself is not at stake, no constitutional essential is involved and the argument may not seem out of bounds. Yet it
seems strange to suppose that on the very same question of the acceptability of abortion as it relates to political decisions, reasons that
are in bounds for one context are out of bounds for another. The
alternative approach here is hardly more appealing.
The alternative approach is that questions crucial to a constitutional essential must be addressed predominantly by public reasons
whenever they are relevant to a political decision, whether or not the
decision involves a constitutional essential. The problem with this approach is that one could then use various religious arguments on the
fetal tissue question unless these arguments wandered too close to
questions that mattered for constitutional essentials. That limitation
on permitted grounds seems arbitrary when one asks whether use of
fetal tissue should be allowed.
I am not going to explore the further refinements that might be
necessary to elaborate how the distinction between ordinary issues
and fundamental issues might work because I believe it is misconceived. I do not think there is a crucial dividing line for public reason
that depends on the kind of issue that is involved. Some of what
Rawls says in PoliticalLiberalism could fit with this thought relatively
comfortably. He seems to suggest that the constraint of public reasons is most important for the essentials, but may well be extended
further. 19 If one inclines to the view that the constraints are desirable
on a broader scale but most important for the essentials, the difficulty
I have posed is not very serious. The problem with this view is that it
happily sacrifices the freedom to rely on comprehensive views for ordinary issues-a freedom that citizens should feel. I would regard
that as a serious loss, so I am disinclined simply to extend the constraint of public reasons to all issues and all citizens. In summary, I
reject one important division that Rawls advances.

M.

How

COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVES RELATE TO PUBLIC
REASONS

It is time now to turn to a more complex and troubling problem:
Precisely what is the relationship between public reasons and comprehensive views in respect to circumstances when the constraint of pub19. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 215.
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lic reasons applies? If a judge or legislator or citizen is supposed to
rely on public reasons, what is he not to rely on that he otherwise
might? Rawls says that "in discussing constitutional essentials.., we
are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines."20 I have assumed that in addressing political issues directly
involving the practice of abortion, someone is not to rely on biblical or
church authority to the effect that an embryo is entitled to the moral
respect of a full human being. I now explore this problem in more
depth.
Let us imagine a member of Congress, Carol, who believes on
religious grounds that the embryo is entitled to such respect. She is
considering whether to vote for a constitutional amendment allowing
much stricter abortion regulation than is permissible under Roe v.
Wade21 and is wondering how to defend her choice on the floor of
Congress. Since Rawls thinks a right to abortion falls within the constitutional essentials, 22 her choices are definitely subject to the constraint of public reasons.
There are three different issues about the relationship between
public reasons and comprehensive views in such circumstances: May
comprehensive views override the constraint of public reasons? May
they supplement public reasons? How far do they intermingle with
and infect public reasons? I am going to address the third issue, but I
shall say just enough about the first two to avoid confusion. It is conceivable that discussions carried on in terms of public reasons may
lead to a result that a person finds abhorrent from the standpoint of
her own comprehensive view.23 Since a person's comprehensive view
is overarching for that person, it is always possible that the grounds
for reaching a correct result according to the comprehensive position
will override the grounds for observing the constraints of public reason. In this sense, the constraints of public reason are provisional, not
conclusive, determinants of how one should act. Rawls recognizes
this, and I agree.
Suppose Carol thinks her position is called for by public reasons
and that it is also called for by the comprehensive views of herself and
others. As a supplement to decision and argument grounded primar20. I& at 224-25.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 243 n.32.
23. Rawls mentions pacifist Quakers as an example in his draft article. Rawls, draft
article, supra note 5, at 22. While the Quaker pacifists may refuse to serve in a war, they
can still support the constitutional regime and democratic institutions that choose to wage
one. Itt

1310

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1303

ily on public reasons, may Carol, consistent with the constraint of public reasons, appeal to her own comprehensive views and to
comprehensive views of others that she does not share? In Political
Liberalism, Rawls indicates that for some highly contested political
issues, people might introduce comprehensive views to explain to opponents how their views support the values of public reason.24 He
also indicates that comprehensive views could be used directly to support conclusions in an unjust society, referring to abolitionists and
Martin Luther King, Jr. as examples.' In his draft article, Rawls approves much wider use of comprehensive views to supplement positions that are primarily defended in terms of public reasons.2 6
How far may Carol's comprehensive view figure in the development of Carol's primary reliance on public reasons? This is the question on which I wish to concentrate, partly because I do not yet have a
precise sense of how Rawls sees this relationship. I start with two
relatively straightforward conceptual possibilities. The first is that a
person can rely internally on her comprehensive view; all she needs to
do is to make sure that what she says publicly does not explicitly rely
on other than public reasons. Since self-censorship about stated
grounds is much simpler than self-censorship of one's process of decision, I believe that the constraints of public reason apply more stringently to public justifications than to internal grounds of decision.
Rawls certainly claims that the constraints cover both public justifications and internal grounds of decision to a substantial degree, 7 so he
plainly rejects this first conceptual possibility.
A second possibility is that someone subject to the constraints of
public reason should try to decide without respect to what she believes
on comprehensive grounds, relying exclusively on public reasons. Of
course, no one is fully capable of making decisions without being influenced by what they believe on comprehensive grounds, but no one
is fully capable of making decisions completely free of personal resentments and prejudices either. Since people should try to decide
political issues free of personal prejudices, perhaps they should try to
decide independent of what they believe on comprehensive grounds.
In an earlier book, criticizing such a position, I wrote of asking people
to "'pluck out their religious convictions'" and to think about questions as if "'they started from scratch, disregarding what they pres24.
25.
26.
27.

RAwLs, supra note 1, at 248-49.
Id at 249-51.
Rawls, draft article, supra note 5, at 10-15.
RAwLs, supra note 1, at 215-16.
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ently take as basic premises of moral thought.' "28 In Political
Liberalism, Rawls explicitly says that this is not what he intends with
his ideal of public reason.29 In the draft article, Rawls addresses
Michael Perry's claim that his theory requires people to bracket their
particular moral convictions and memberships in moral communities." Again, Rawls says that his ideal of public reason requires no
such bracketing. 1 What exactly does Rawls see as the relationship
between comprehensive views and public reasons in the development
of positions that rely on public reasons?
We have already touched on three relationships. First, Rawls supposes that in most liberal democracies, most comprehensive views will
endorse an ideal of public reason. Thus, Carol's own comprehensive
view will probably encourage her not to rely on certain comprehensive grounds for the resolution of fundamental political issues. Observance of an ideal of public reason will in a full sense be an application
of Carol's comprehensive view, not a rejection or disregard of it. Second, the comprehensive view may be used to supplement decisions
and arguments based on public reason. Third, a comprehensive view
stands in the background as a possible source to override the constraints of public reason if the results seem egregious enough. In all
these three senses, Rawls clearly does not expect people to abandon
their comprehensive views, but these connections do not go to the
heart of Perry's concern or my more general concern about Rawls. 2
We are thinking primarily of the reasoning by which one arrives at a
particular political decision. If Carol is going to arrive at a decision
based on public reasons, how far may her comprehensive view count
for the decision? That is my concern here.
We can imagine Carol's comprehensive view supplying background premises or narrower links in a chain of argument. We can
imagine her relying on the premises when she thinks public reasons
themselves point in the same direction, or when public reasons are
radically inconclusive, or even when she thinks public reasons standing alone point in the opposite direction.
In this hardly precise categorization, I mean by background
premises such beliefs as "human life should be highly respected" and
28. Id. at 244 n.33 (quoting
ICAL CHOICE

KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLIT-

155 (1988)).

29. Id.
30. Rawls, draft article, supra note 5, at 5 & n.8 (citing MICiAEL
POLITICS AND LAW (1988)).
31. Id. at 5-6..
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

PERRY, MORALITY,
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"caring for the poor is a high priority." When a person has such beliefs based on her comprehensive view, disregarding them is difficult
when she approaches political issues. I believe, without full confidence, that Rawls thinks a person may appropriately employ her comprehensive view in this way, at least when the background premises
are not at odds with generally shared beliefs in the society.
The more troubling problem for his theory is that of narrower
links in a chain of argument. The specific case on which I want to
focus is one in which a person thinks a plausible argument, based on
public reasons, can be made for the position that fits with that person's comprehensive view but that the competing argument is stronger
if one looks exclusively to public reasons. This formulation is abstract,
and I shall illustrate the question with the abortion problem. Since
there are various features of the example with which one might take
issue, I want to emphasize strongly that the point of the example is to
serve as an illustration, not to stand by itself against possible
challenges.33
Here is some of what Rawls says about abortion:
Suppose... that we consider the question in terms of these
three important political values: the due respect for human
life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time,
including the family in some form, and finally the equality of
women as equal citizens. (There are, of course, other important political values besides these.) Now I believe any reasonable balance of these three values will give a woman a
duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester. The reason for this is that at
this early stage of pregnancy the political value of the equality of women is overriding, and this right is required to give it
substance and force.34
Carol is a recent convert to Roman Catholicism. Prior to her
conversion, she was strongly persuaded that public reasons supported
a liberal right to abortion. She has now paid much more attention to
the "natural" genetic argument that an embryo has a moral status like
that of a developed person and to authoritative church statements that
abortion is a terrible wrong. She presently believes that the fetus has
the moral status of a full person. Carol also believes that if that point
is taken as a premise, the balance of public reasons favors a regime of
33. Of course, if I could not come up with any realistic examples, that would suggest
that the problem as I pose it is not a genuine one.
34. RAwLS, supra note 1, at 243 n.32.
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regulation of abortion that is substantially more restrictive than the
constitutional rules of Roe v. Wade.3 5 She further believes that a plausible argument limited entirely to public reasons can be made for the

high moral status of the fetus, but she finds the argument of public
reasons against that status to be more persuasive than the argument in
favor. Carol recognizes that it is her confidence in the Church's authority that causes her to believe in the high moral status of the fetus.
Were she to act upon her full view, a crucial link in the complete chain
of her reasoning about abortion would be supplied by her comprehensive view. Yet she could state a fairly powerful argument limited to
terms of public reasons, advancing a plausible case based on public
reasons alone even for the link that her comprehensive view supplies
for her. My own view is that in a situation like this, legislators or
citizens, but not ordinarily judges, may appropriately rely on their
comprehensive views to reach their judgment. Legislators and what I
call "quasi-public" citizens, 36 however, should cast their public arguments in terms of public reasons.
What does Rawls think? He writes that the ideal of citizenship
imposes a "duty of civility-to be able to explain to one another on
those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they ad37
vocate.., can be supported by the political values of public reason.
He says that "[w]hat public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain their vote to one''38another in terms of a reasonable balance of
public political values.
I believe Rawls means to require a sincere justification. I also
believe that explicit reliance on the Church's authority, even for one
link in an argument that is generally cast in terms of public reasons,
would violate the constraints of public reason. I conclude that, for
Rawls, Carol should not rely explicitly on the Church's authority, nor
should she rely publicly on "public reason" arguments-for the high
moral status of the fetus-in which she does not really believe. Thus,
if she constrains herself according to public reason, Carol should not
support a constitutional amendment to allow more restrictive rules
about abortion.

35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Quasi-public citizens include presidents of major corporations and universities and
writers of national columns-people who consistently occupy public, nongovernmental
positions.
37. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 217.
38. Id. at 243; see id. at 226-27, 246.
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I am not sure Rawls has considered any example quite like this;
possibly he does not believe any such example is soundly conceived.
Objection might be taken to the example on the ground that abortion
is a highly unusual problem. At the New Orleans conference,39 Rawls
indicated that for constitutional essentials he mainly had in mind more
basic political structures and traditional liberties. I shall offer another
example that is less stark but falls closer to the core of political liberties. It involves freedom of religion.
In Corporationof the Presiding Bishop v. Amos n0 the Supreme
Court considered a constitutional challenge to an exception to Title
VII that allows religious organizations to discriminate on religious
grounds."' Appellee Mayson had been fired from his job as a building
engineer at the Deseret Gymnasium, a nonprofit facility owned and
run by organizations of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints.4 2 He was fired because he had failed to qualify for a "temple
recommend," certifying that he was a member of the Church in good
standing, eligible to attend its temples.4 3 Mayson's constitutional
claim was that the existing exemption for religious organizations from
antidiscrimination rules was an unconstitutional establishment of reli44
gion because it exempted nonreligious as well as religious activities.
The Supreme Court sustained the law on the basis that there was good
reason to avoid having courts decide which activities are religious and
which are not.45
Concurring opinions emphasized that nonprofit organizations
were involved and that the validity of such a broad exemption for
profit-making activities remained open.46 As Justice Brennan recognized most explicitly, two competing aspects of religious liberty were
at stake.47 The coercion that the provision permits-a religious organization can effectively tell an employee he must conform or lose
his job-"is in serious tension with our commitment to individual
freedom of conscience in matters of religious belief. '4 8 However,
39. Jurisprudence Section Program, Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting, New Orleans, La. (Jan. 8, 1995).
40. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
41. ld. at 329-30.
42. Id at 330.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 331.
45. See id. at 339.

46, See id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 346 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at
349 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. I& at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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"religious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their
internal affairs." 49
What I want to discuss is not the Court's decision of the constitutional issue, but the legislative choice that preceded it. Congress could
have provided no exemption, exempted only religious activities, or exempted all activities. It could have provided a broader exemption for
nonprofit activities than profit-making activities. I believe public reasons firmly establish that religious organizations should be able to
discriminate on religious grounds for jobs with serious religious significance. Thus, some exemption is definitely called for. Whether for
nonprofit activities the exemption should be full or limited to religious
jobs is a hard question. Suppose Carl must decide which position to
support. Carl believes that public reasons can plausibly support either
position. He thinks, on balance, the public reasons favor the full exemption, which acknowledges church autonomy and obviates the
problem of judicial categorization at the edges. But Carl's comprehensive view leads him to think organized religion has had, and will
continue to have, a devastating effect on genuine human autonomy.
Can Carl, subject to the constraint of public reasons, properly support
restricting the exemption in the manner that would be regarded as
desirable according to his comprehensive view? Carl's choice closely
resembles Carol's about the abortion amendment. My sense of Rawls
is that Carl should stick to public reasons in deciding what to do unless
the result is so offensive that his comprehensive view overrides the
grounds for adhering to public reason.50
This illustration shows that even though public reasons may
render overwhelming support for the concept of certain liberties and
the core of their application, there will-be at the edges close questions
where public reasons are fairly evenly balanced. Why, in such circumstances, should legislators and citizens need to focus on public reasons
alone rather than introducing comprehensive perspectives into their
assessments? If the implications of Rawls's view are as I have indicated, his constraints of public reason do impose somewhat sharper
limits on the use of comprehensive views than I believe are
appropriate.

49. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Perhaps it takes less to override a modest departure from public reasons than a
gross one.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES, OR

SoME MoRE LIMITED REACH

I turn now to my third problem, which involves doubts about how
much may be said concerning public reason for liberal democracies in
general. More particularly, I have doubts that respect for citizens as
equals requires the precise understanding of public reasons that Rawls
presents or any other precise understanding. The discussion so far
strongly supports these doubts.
Constraints of public reason involve reciprocal self-restraint. I, as
a legislator or citizen, do not rely directly on my comprehensive view
to resolve particular issues like abortion; you, in turn, do not rely on
your comprehensive view. People give up something in return for
protection from impositions by other people. Why should we suppose
that reflective, reasonable people in a liberal democracy will believe
that such an exchange of restraints is called for? This is a tremendously complicated question. First, we may agree with Rawis that
people will want to protect their own right to practice their religion or
other comprehensive view.51 For this reason, they will agree on substantial liberty to believe and practice comprehensive views. But not
every reliance on one comprehensive view involves an imposition on
other comprehensive views. Decisions about environmental protection based on comprehensive perspectives, for example, will not typically impinge on the beliefs and practices of those with other
comprehensive perspectives. Why might people agree on restraints of
public reason that reach beyond instances of imposition?
Rawls stresses the plurality of comprehensive perspectives that
will exist in liberal democracies. 52 But, I think one cannot easily move
from this proposition to a standard of public reasons. One needs to
address the degree of mutual trust of political judgments based on
comprehensive perspectives, and people's sense of the constellations
of various views. Very briefly, one might have a high degree of trust
that people with other comprehensive views will, when they rely on
them, reach conclusions that are acceptable. For example, I consider
myself a liberal Christian. My comprehensive view is far removed
from that of law faculty colleagues who are atheists, yet I would feel
considerable confidence in being governed according to political decisions they made that fit with their comprehensive views. Also, if one
believes that comprehensive views themselves are so diverse that one
51. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 220-22.
52. Id. at 243-44 & n.33.
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has little to fear if decisions are reached by individual citizens and
legislators in accord with comprehensive views, one might not worry
much about their employment. Of course, some people might fear
their use even if most people did not, but these people might equally
fear decisions based on public reasons. What I am driving at is that
cultural factors peculiar to individual societies will largely determine
whether constraints of reason will seem required by fairness and stability. These factors will also largely determine what the appropriate
constraints are. We should be suspicious of the idea that analysis of
the conditions of liberal democracy in general will yield any fairly precise line between constitutional essentials and ordinary issues and will
also yield some subtle demarcation of how far comprehensive views
can figure in the development of positions based on public reasons.
Perhaps on these points all liberal democracies are sufficiently similar,
but I do not suppose that the constraints appropriate for a homogeneous society like Sweden will necessarily be the same as those appropriate for a country as diverse and contentious as the United States.
Let me state more specifically the way in which the earlier analysis bears on this problem. If one understands how complicated and
disputable some of the distinctions proposed or implied by Rawls are,
one must doubt that any constraints with such degree of precision can
be drawn from general conditions of liberal democracy.
My doubts on this score illustrate how I differ from Rawls in
thinking that more depends on particular cultures and stages of history and less on general propositions about forms of government. I
believe the subject of public reason needs to be addressed retail,
rather than wholesale. My own conclusions about public reason in the
United States do not rely on any distinction between constitutional
essentials and other issues. The result is that ordinary citizens should
regard themselves as much less constrained and legislators somewhat
less constrained than Rawls asserts with respect to constitutional essentials; but legislators and quasi-public citizens should consider themselves more constrained than Rawls suggests for ordinary issues.
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